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I present a model that combines the key features of a Schumpeterian
growth model without scale e¤ects and a North South model of trade.
All open economies converge to parallel growth paths because of costly
technological transfer. I study the e¤ects of intellectual property rights
(IPR) regimes and trade policies on the growth rate, as well as on a
given countrys economic performance. The requirement that trade be
balanced neutralizes all potential e¤ects of the tari¤ policy on the worlds
growth rate, and on the performance of a single country. By contrast,
an improvement of a given countrys IPR regime is growth neutral but
improves a countrys position in the worlds productivity rank. These
ndings are shown to be consistent with observedempirical relationships.
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1 Introduction
One of the main concerns of the modern theory of economic development is
how globalization a¤ects economic performance. A signicant recent aspect
of globalization is the tremendous rise in the degree of economic openness and
integration across the world. A key feature of this phenomenon is the increasing
developing country share of world trade. Currently trade between the developed
(OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries is the fastest growing category
in trade growth statistics. For example, over the past thirty years, the volume
of U.S. trade (as a share of US GDP) with non-OECD economies has increased
more than four-fold.
The issue of trade openness and the reduction of trade barriers is currently
a matter of international debate. Until the mid nineties the developed countries
had been the most active pursuers of trade liberalization, whereas now many
amongst the less developed countries have begun to promote tari¤ reduction.
The most important example is the case of China where the chance to join the
WTO is being touted by their leaders as a way to grow rich".
The perception of benecial e¤ects of trade on growth seems to stand at
odds with empirical ndings, however. The tremendous growth in trade vol-
umes contrasts with fairly stable growth rates that have been observed over the
past 100 years in developed economies. A natural question to ask is whether the
rising degree of trade openness has indeed had any e¤ect on the growth rate
of advanced countries, and whether we should expect it to. The present paper
analyzes the e¤ects of changing trade policies on regional economic performance
as well as on the worlds growth rate. A related issue addressed is the e¤ect
that the degree of protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in develop-
ing countries has on this. Many experts and commentators have argued that
improvement in poor countriesintellectual property rights is key to obtaining
growth enhancing e¤ects. The importance of the issue of IPR was conrmed by
its inclusion into the statutes of the WTO in 1994. However, after more than
ten years, the extent to which less developed countries should protect intellec-
tual property, and in whose interests such protection should be implemented, is
still not clear.
From a theoretical point of view there is no doubt that intellectual property
rights matter. Most economists agree that technology is the engine of growth,
and the key element that motivates people to devote resources to benecial
technology improvements is the potential to exploit rents from it that the pro-
tection of intellectual property allows. Most authors agree that high standards
of IPR protection are benecial for the innovating economies (Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom 2005; Gancia, 2003; Connolly and Valderrama, 2005). Some studies
(e.g. Helpman, 1993) have, however, highlighted the negative aspects of IPR
protection for lagging economies. Strong enforcement of intellectual property
protection increases consumer prices and reduces trade benets that could be
crucial for developing economies. Most of these studies implicitly assumed per-
fect substitutability between internationally produced goods. Here I refer to
famous hypothesis formulated by Armington (1969) and summarized by Krug-
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man and Obstfeld (1994), that goods are di¤erentiated according to region of
origin. In other words, even within the same sector internationally produced
goods are perceived by consumers as imperfect substitutes. Such formulation
drifts the attention away from the international aspect of intellectual property
rights and points at the local issues of IPR protection.
The term globalization mostly refers to an increase in international openness.
In this study I analyze two di¤erent cases of openness: openness to international
ows of ideas and openness to trade. In addition to the e¤ects of trade policies,
I consider the impact of regional intellectual property rights regimes on regional
economic performance and the worlds growth rate. Both issues previously
highlighted in the literature play a role: IPR a¤ects the incentives for research
in the developed countries as well as prices paid by consumers. The present
study seeks to understand to what extent improvements in local IPRs have
an e¤ect on the long run growth rate in a globalized world. It also analyzes
the nature of transitional changes and the role that trade tari¤s play in the
interaction with these changes. Finally, the framework is useful for addressing
the issue of whether partial openness (i.e. for trade only, and not for ideas), or no
openness, could be more benecial for a lagging country than full participation
in globalized markets.
I develop a dynamic, general equilibrium model of growth and trade that,
importantly, has no scale e¤ects to analyze these issues. To do this, I merge
two streams of the literature - modern endogenous growth theory (which allows
sophisticated representation of an economy without scale e¤ects) and North -
South trade models (with the well-modelled international interactions). I use an
extension of the Armington hypothesis to implement trade equations. Using a
model without scale e¤ects is essential here because the size of markets increases
many fold when countries open themselves to international trade. Models with
scale e¤ects, though simpler, lead to immediately counter-factual implications
regarding growth rates, and are therefore of little use in analyzing growth re-
lated issues. The model developed here is a Schumpeterian multi-region model
of growth with both horizontal and vertical expansions. One region (denoted
the frontier country) is determined endogenously as the technological leader and
has highest aggregate productivity. Firms from the frontier country devote re-
sources to innovative R&D to discover higher quality products and rms from all
other countries devote resources to imitative R&D to copy the discoveries made
by the technological leaders. A successful imitation results in quality upgrading
of local products, that di¤er to some extent from their models in the frontier
country. The costs of imitation in a given country depend on its distance to
the technological frontier of the frontier country. The rates of innovation and
imitation are endogenously determined based on expected prot maximization
together with labor market clearing conditions. Balanced trade accounts de-
termine the degree of wage inequality between the frontier country and given
lagging country.
The paper relates closely to various streams of the literature. The rst is
the modern Schumpeterian growth literature pioneered by Grossman and Help-
man (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1991), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos
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(1990), and developed further by Young (1998), Howitt (1999) and Peretto and
Smulders (2002). This stream of literature is concerned with the mechanics of
economic growth. The recent contributions allow modelling economies growing
at constant rates with factor inputs growing (hence - these models are con-
sistent with empirical observations). The scale e¤ect is neutralized in these
models by markets expanding into new sectors which e¤ectively dilutes research
e¤orts pushing the frontier. The more populous a given economy, the greater
the number of sectors (and thus potential directions of research) it comprises.
Although elegant and consistent with the data, such formulations cause prob-
lems when it comes to modelling trade. The question of what happens when
two countries of di¤erent sizes (i.e. with a di¤erent number of sectors) start to
trade still remains unaddressed in the studies that build on models without scale
e¤ects. Until now the literature that employed growth models without scale -
e¤ects focused on the ow of ideas as the only means by which international
interaction occurred. Here, I posit a modelling solution to the problem of trade
between countries of di¤erent sizes and hence am able to analyze this situation
as well. The key assumption which allows this is that the trade of goods from
various sectors facilitates horizontal expansion in smaller countries. This allows
me to solve the model without introducing scale e¤ects while at the same time
not violating balanced trade accounting.
The paper is also closely related to the literature on North - South trade.1
I build on the existing North - South trade models (Grossman and Helpman
1991b, Taylor 1993 and 1994) with the addition of components that allow me to
generate a model without scale e¤ects. Some existing studies in this literature
have solved the problem of scale e¤ects by postulating the heterogeneity of coun-
tries with respect to R&D capabilities (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2005). In
contrast, I present a general framework in which there are no innate di¤erences
across agents in their capacity to perform R&D.
An additional question often analyzed in the growth literature concerns so
called conditional convergence, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).2 Condi-
tional convergence seems to be conrmed by empirical studies (see Barro, 2001
for an overview) and assigns to each economy its destination position in the
worlds productivity rank. Changes in policy might result in a shift in such
destination positions and lead to transitional growth. Numerous studies high-
light factors that could a¤ect conditional convergence, such as capital produc-
tivity, rules of law, or distortions of domestic and international markets. My
study contributes by adding the degree of intellectual property rights protec-
tion and relative size of a given economy (in terms of R&D capable population)
as additional factors that could a¤ect conditional convergence. The quality of
intellectual property rights is often assumed to be captured by the R&D pro-
ductivity parameter, which does not allow for a deeper analysis of potential
disadvantages of strong IPR (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom, 2005). Other existing studies that analyze aspects of intellectual
1See Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) for an excellent reference.
2Conditional convergence is a particular case of so-called -convergence (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995).
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property protection mainly discuss their international aspects (Taylor 1993 and
1994, Gancia, 2003). A number of studies (e.g. Helpman 1993, Grossman and
Lai, 2004) that consider local IPR regimes, focus on the potential drawbacks of
strong IPR. Recent evidence on the costliness of imitation (Coe and Helpman,
1995 or Benhabib and Spiegel, 2002) suggests that one should include the costs
of imitative R&D also. This could signicantly change the conclusions by neu-
tralizing the negative price e¤ect through increased R&D incentives. My study
also develops this direction. Here, stronger IPR increases the price of locally
produced goods, and also increases the expected returns from investment (which
matters with positive costs of imitation).
The main results of the paper are: (1) an improvement in IPR by lagging
countries does not have any global e¤ect on growth rates. If any group of lag-
ging countries (no matter how large) decides to change its IPR regime, this will
only a¤ect countries within this group. (2) Any improvement of intellectual
property protection implies a change in the distribution of individual incomes.
Particularly, the share of income accruing to monopolistic rms grows and the
share that comes from wages paid to labor shrinks. (3) The factors that deter-
mine conditional convergence are the degree of IPR protection and the volume
of skilled (R&D capable) workers in the economy. (4) No openness (autarky)
of a single lagging country may result in faster growth than engagement in
globalization (full openness).
This paper is structured as follows. The next section sketches the theoretical
model. Section three presents the dynamics of the model. Section four presents
the main properties of the equilibrium and discusses the potential benets of
openness. Section ve performs a simple empirical test that supports the the-
oretical predictions. The last section concludes and points out directions for
future research.
2 The Model
In this section I discuss the role of the main assumptions that underlie the
theoretical model. I also present the basic equations I will use in my analysis.
The construction of the model presented in this section heavily follows so called
Schumpeterian models of creative destruction proposed by Grossman and Help-
man (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) though the formulation here, which
aims to rule out scale e¤ects is heavily inuenced by Howitt (1999 and 2000).
2.1 Overview
Consider a multi - region model where regions are distinguished by the size of
population and by the degree of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
Specically, there is only one region - the frontier country - where intellectual
property is fully protected.3 All other regions - the lagging countries - have
3Generally, the frontier country o¤ers the highest level of IPR protection in the world. I
assume that intellectual property is perfectly protected in the frontier country just for com-
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weaker and thus imperfect protection of intellectual property.
Each region has a continuum of sectors that produce commodity goods. Each
sector is subject to technical progress. Workers in all regions are assumed to
be capable of conducting vertical (technology improving) R&D that reduces the
costs of production. Each industry o¤ers an innite number of potential tech-
nology improvements. Meanwhile there are new sectors created in the process of
serendipitous discoveries. Newly created sectors start with technological levels
similar to those already existing.
There are two channels of international interaction: trade in commodities
and the ow of ideas. Incentives for trade come from individual preferences
as individuals gain additional utility from consumption of international prod-
ucts. This is an extension of the Armington hypothesis, and in practice this
is expressed by a standard CES-utility function with goods di¤erentiated with
respect to their origin of production.
The second channel of international interaction is ow of ideas. It a¤ects
both: vertical and horizontal expansion. First, international ow of ideas allows
for imitation of old technologies in the lagging countries. Imitation requires
some resources to be spent. The costliness of imitation is an observed and
widely accepted phenomenon, see for example Manseld, Schwartz and Wagner
(1981), Coe and Helpman (1995) or Benhabib and Spiegel (2002). Costliness
implies that when a country wants to create a new generation of a product,
or to open a new line of varieties, it must pay costs proportional to the costs
that have been paid to make the discovery and proportional to the current
stat-of-the-art technology in the given sector. This is captured by an index of
copying di¢ culty. This index depends positively on the size of the lag relative
to the advanced country. In terms of vertical R&D - the further a sector in
a given country is from the technological frontier, and the more steps "up-the
quality ladder" have been made abroad, the easier it is to take the next step.
The second case of international ow of ideas concerns the pace of horizontal
expansion (opening of new sectors). The new sectors are being created in the
process of serendipitous discoveries. However, the open countries can benet
from trade with goods of new sectors, so that countries that trade with goods
have same numbers of sectors opened.
2.2 Industry structure
There is a continuum of regions indexed by j, that range from 0 to 1. In each
region there is a continuum of industries indexed by i 2 [0; Bjt), where Bjt
measures the total number of di¤erent industries in the region. In each industry
i rms di¤er with respect to the technology of production they posses. A better
technology implies lower unit costs required to produce a given good i. To
discover unit cost reductions, rms in each industry participate in innovative
R&D races. When the state-of-the-art technology in a given industry is k, the
next winner of an innovative R&D race becomes the sole producer with a k+1
putational convenience.
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technology. Thus, over time, the quantities produced grow as innovations push
technology in each industry up its quality ladder.
A more detailed representation of the industry structure is presented later.
2.3 Individuals
Each region has a xed number of households. Each household member lives
forever and is endowed with one unit of labor that is inelastically supplied in
exchange for wage (wjt). The number of members of each household grows
exponentially at a xed rate gL > 0, the population growth rate. Each region has
identical rates of population growth so that the ratios of population volumes in
all regions are proportional. Let Lj > 0 be the size of representative household
in region j and let Ljt denote the supply of labor in region j at time t, hence:
Ljt = Lje
gLt (1)
Households in all countries share identical preferences. Each household is
modeled as a dynastic family that consists of innitely-lived consumers that





where u(ct) denotes the individual utility form consumption at t and  is the
rate of time preference. Optimal consumption growth _c=c requires









where ut(ct(i)) denotes the utility of consumption of products from sector i and
Bmaxjt denotes the total number of sectors, of which goods are available in j
.
Goods in each sector i can be produced in any region j. The individual utility







;  > 1 (5)
so that products from di¤erent regions are gross substitutes.
Denote the per sector expenditures in country j by Ejt. Each individual
at time t maximizes u(ct(i)) subject to the budget constraint. The logarithmic
preferences dened by (4) imply that in equilibrium each individual spends
equal amounts per sector. Within each sector he demands goods produced in
all countries. Note that this also implies that consumers choose the cheapest
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products from each industry of each country. To express the gross prices that
consumers need to pay for a given good, introduce the parameter  j  1:
This parameter reects the institutional, legal and regulatory impediments to
entering directly into a market of country j by o¤ering a consumption product.
Parameter  j should be interpreted as an iceberg cost of international trade.4
The case of  j = 1 denotes fully free access to international markets; the
opposite, limiting case of  j ! 1 represents extremely high levels of tari¤s
so that there is no international trade with a given country. The case when
 j !1 will be discussed in subsection 4.1.













  jj0 are the tari¤s imposed by j on j0 such that:  jj0 = 1 if j = j0 and
 jj0 =  j otherwise,
 pjt(i) is the price in industry i in country j at t.
2.4 Production
Production consists of continuum of industries (indexed by i) using labor as the
only input. One worker at time t can produce Ajt(i) goods in industry i in
country j. Ajt(i) changes as a result of technological progress. Every new
discovery increases Ajt(i) by an exogenous factor  > 1.
Every new discovery results in the establishment of a local monopolist that
has the unique right to produce with the state-of-the-art technology Ajt(i)
in j. We will assume that discoveries are large enough so that there is no
potential threat of domestic competition.5 Thus, a monopolist in a given sector
is restricted only by international competition. Denote the instantaneous prots
of a regional quality leader by jt(i), where:
jt(i) = (pjt(i)  wjt=Ajt) qjt(i) (7)
Maximizing jt(i) with respect to pjt(i) and taking into account equation









4One can assume that the tari¤ revenues are paid back to citizens of j as a lump - sum
transfer.
5Alternatively suppose that each time a new discovery occurs, the old monopolist faces a
threat of being undercut by the new entrant that possesses now a better technology. Therefore
the old monopolist decides to quit the market.
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which is the standard monopoly markup of price over marginal cost. Equation










Recall that there is a continuum of markets, so that there is no e¤ect of a
single market on total demand. Hence instantaneous prots at t of a regional
monopolist in j are equal to:























The R&D sector also uses labor as the only input.6 The purpose of research
activity is to improve productivity in a given sector and obtain a rent on the
improvement. However, patents in all the lagging countries can be imperfect
at protecting such rents. The imperfection of the quality of protection of in-
tellectual property implies that at each instant of time there is a chance that
the patent granted to the current monopolist becomes violable. Let  be the
instantaneous probability of such an event. In such a representation  sym-
bolizes both the degree of monopolistic power given to the discoverer and the
quality of legal enforcement. The case of  = 0 denotes the case when intellec-
tual property rights are perfectly protected, i.e. there is no risk for a current
state-of-the art producer that his technology becomes publicly available. The
opposite limiting case of  ! 1 means that there is virtually no protection of
intellectual property in a given country.
If a company loses its patent before a succeeding discovery occurs, its sector
becomes leveled to competition and Bertrand competition drives the prices to
marginal costs of production pjt(i) = wjt=Ajt(i).
Every vertical innovation in industry i increases marginal labor output by
an exogenous factor  > 1. A successful discoverer benets by a stream of
monopolistic prots in their industry until replaced by the next discovery, or
the patent becomes violable.
Successful imitation (copying) also takes the form of an increase in labor
productivity by : Let xjt be the di¢ culty parameter that adjusts the instan-
taneous probability of a discovery in region j: The ease by which the next step
6Note that since L is an input in research, it should be interpreted as a measure of skilled
workers (capable of doing research) rather than raw labor force.
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up the quality ladder can be taken depends on the degree a given sector in
a given country lags the world technology frontier. This degree of lagging of
country j in sector i is captured by the average technology of all the countries





where f() is the density function of technology in all countries, with the con-
vention of f > 0 (so that countries are ordered from the most lagging to the
most advanced). Such a representation of xjt is rather complicated to use in
analysis, so for tractability I work with a simplied version of this index which
has similar qualitative properties. Specically, I will utilize the average produc-
tivity level of only one country (the frontier country) as the benchmark. Such a
formulation corresponds to that used in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002,
2003, and 2004), where the frontier sector/country is the point of reference used
there as well.







Ajt(i)di is the average productivity in country j and
A1t denotes the average productivity of the frontier country7 . The di¢ culty
of vertical research is equal to the inverse of the distance to the technological
frontier.8
Labor is the only input in vertical R&D and free entry is assumed. Any R&D
rm that hires njt(i) units of labor in industry i at t is successful in discovery of
the next higher quality product with probability [njt(i)=xjt] where  > 0 is
the productivity parameter of vertical innovations. Denote by Vjt(i) the value
of a successful vertical innovation in sector i. By the no-arbitrage condition,
the marginal revenue of vertical research ([Vjt(i)=xjt]) must be equal to the
marginal costs of research wjt, hence:
Vjt(i)=xjt = wjt: (13)
2.6 Horizontal expansion
Horizontal expansion occurs in the process of serendipitous discoveries (as in
Howitt, 2000). A successful event in the process of horizontal expansion results
in establishment of a new industry lab in the manufacturing sector. New mo-
nopolists enjoy a prot stream until displaced by the next discovery. Assume
that the technological level of the newly established industry is randomly drawn
7Consequently I henceforth denote with subscript 1 all the variables related to the frontier
country.
8Thus for the frontier country x1t = 1:
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from technological levels of existing products. Each agent has the same propen-
sity for discovery ( ). Moreover, the trading countries benet from the fact
that they trade with goods from various sectors, so that the volume of sectors
in the globalized world is the same for all countries. The pace with which a new
industry innovates is then determined by the largest country in terms of R&D
capable population (Lmax).
Consequently, the rate of new product innovation in a isolated country is:
_Bjt =  Ljt, (14)
and in the globalized world it is:
_Bt =  L
max
t , (15)
where  > 0 and Lmaxt is the largest R&D capable population of a country
engaged in globalization.
2.7 The Stock Market
There is a stock market that transfers savings of consumers to local rms en-
gaged in R&D. It helps individuals to diversify the risk of holding stocks issued
by these rms. Since, in each country, there is a continuum of industries and
the expected returns to R&D activities are not rm or industry specic, each
investor can completely mitigate risk by holding a perfectly diversied portfo-
lio of stocks. Thus, the value of expected returns from holding the stocks of
regional quality leaders (Vjt(i) ) must be equal for each industry (i.e., it does
not depend on i). This value equals the stream of prots discounted by the
subjective rate of time - preference, rate of population growth and adjusted for







(r + njs(i)=xjs + j) ds

d (16)






  j = r (17)
For an investor in a stock, every time increment brings prots of jt(i) and
appreciation of stock value of _Vjt(i). In case of new discoveries or losses in IPR
protection, the investor su¤ers a loss of Vjt(i): This happens if another rm
reports a success in vertical R&D (with instantaneous probability nj(i)=xj)
or if a given sector becomes leveled (with instantaneous probability j). No
arbitrage implies that this return must equal the market interest rate r.
3 The Steady-State
This section presents the solution of the model for a limiting steady-state equi-
librium where all endogenous variables grow at constant rates over time. In
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this balanced growth equilibrium, variables that are constant over time include
per-sector consumption expenditures Ej , the wage rates for labor wj , the per
sector innovation and imitation rate nj and the regional distance to the frontier
1=xj .
3.1 Horizontal Research and Labor per Sector Steady-
State Conditions
This subsection solves for the horizontal expansion and labor per sector steady-






















The rate of horizontal expansion is described for a country that remains in
autarky by (14) and for a country that is engaged in globalization by (15). Thus











where lj is the relative size of a countrys compared to the largest country




The above presented equations mean that in all countries the value of bj
is constant over time. In other words, the number of individuals per sector is
constant. In terms of individual utility from consumption (4) these results imply
that for a country that engages in globalization Bmaxjt = Bt, and for a country
that remains isolated Bmaxjt = Bjt.
3.2 Representative prices
This subsection introduces the notion of representative prices. A representative
price is the expected price of a randomly selected commodity in a given region.
In the frontier country, all the sectors are controlled by monopolies, so that
all the prices (hence the representative price as well) are monopolistic prices.
However, in the lagging countries, some sectors (fraction jt of the total num-
ber of sectors) are levelled by competition and have Bertrand prices of pj(i) =
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wjt=Ajt(i): The values of the fractions of leveled sectors describe the market
structure and can be computed as the relative instantaneous probability of los-
ing IPR protection (j) to the aggregate instantaneous probability of losing

















(=(  1)) + j

, then:
pj =  jwjt=Ajt (22)
3.3 Trade balance
Balance on the trade account requires that for any country j the values of



































































Equation (25) implies that the ratio of per sector expenditures to the adjusted
per capita price level is constant across the regions. Consequently, anything
that could a¤ect the world price index - particularly changes in IPR regimes of
other regions (whether such changes occur in one region or in a larger group of
regions) does not a¤ect Q. Any changes abroad are neutralized by the trade
account. A more detailed discussion of this feature is presented later.
Note that the constancy of Q across countries together with equation (10)
translates into the following expression of instantaneous prots earned by local
monopolists:
j = Ej" ()  
 1
j = j (26)















Every agent in each region can choose between being employed in production or
in a research company. Thus, total population consists of people employed in
production and vertical research. The labor market equation for each country
























Hence for country j the labor market constraint is:
Ej
 j jwj
+ nj = bj : (28)
3.5 The Stock Market
In the steady state equilibrium the market interest rate r by (3) equals the
subjective discount factor () minus the rate of population growth (gL). Besides,
the value of expected returns from holding the stocks of a regional quality leader
is constant over time (i.e. _Vj = 0). Recall that no-arbitrage in entrepreneurial
entry requires the value of a vertical discovery to be equal to the opportunity
cost of research (i.e. to the wage) adjusted for the probability of achieving a
given discovery (=xjt). This is represented by equation (13) and together with











This subsection presents a detailed solution of the model for a limiting steady-
state equilibrium. First, I present the solution for the frontier country and then
for a representative lagging country j.
Since all sectors in the frontier country have monopolistic prices, solving the
model for a steady-state equilibrium for the frontier country reduces to solving
a system of three equations [the innovative R&D condition given by (29), prot
equation (26) together with the labor market constraint (28)] in three unknowns
[E1; 1 and n1]. Using 1 from (26) in (29) gives a system of two equations and
two unknowns. In this respect, this model of trade is similar to Grossman and
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Helpman (1991a), who also obtain a system where the equilibrium is determined
by the prot equation and resource constraint.
Solving the prot equation [(26) and (29)] together with the labor market















These two equations can be re-arranged to express the values of per-sector ex-


















Before discussing the characteristics of this steady state, I briey present
the steady state in a representative lagging country. Note that the values of
expenditures and research of the frontier country (E1 and n1) depend only on
parameter values. They cannot be a¤ected by any changes of policy in any
lagging country. Hence, each lagging country takes the values of E1 and n1 as
given.
To nd the right expression for the vertical R&D intensity in j, recall
that the di¢ culty parameter xj is the inverse of the distance to the frontier
1=xj = A1=Aj . In steady state, all countries have the same rate of technolog-












n1 ln = nj=xj ln
n1 = nj=xj (34)
Hence, in the steady state, vertical R&D intensity of a given lagging country is
the frontier countrys R&D intensity adjusted by the distance to the frontier.
Rearranging equation (28) together with the above expression of js vertical



























Solving the imitative R&D condition (29), and substituting into (26) yields the








  gL + j + nN
: (37)
















therefore for any region j,  j() can be treated as an additional parameter.
Equations (35)  (37) can be solved for the unique equilibrium per-sector
expenditures (Ej), wages (wj) and distance to the frontier (1=xj).
4 Main properties of the Steady-State equilib-
rium
I start the discussion of the above-described Steady-State equilibrium from the
perspective of the frontier country region. The degree of IPR in any lagging
country, and any foreign tari¤ do not appear in the frontier countrys steady
state conditions: (32) and (33). The volume of consumption expenditures (E1)
and vertical research (n1) in the frontier country do not depend on any foreign
IPR regime or tari¤ policy. Hence, the frontiers (and the worlds) growth rate
are una¤ected by any changes in tari¤s or IPR regimes in the any of the lagging
countries. In summary:
Proposition 1 In steady-state the rate of economic growth of all open economies
is equal to the growth rate of the technologically most advanced economy. This
rate of economic growth depends neither on any trade policies of any country
( j) nor on any potential changes in IPR regimes in technologically lagging
countries (j).
In order to understand these results recall the equation (26). This allows
for a re-interpretation of instantaneous prots: each company in a given sector
sells its products abroad to foreign companies from the same sector and gets
their products in exchange. These products are then sold on the local market
and potential prots from this transaction are earned by local companies. In
such a case, any change in the foreign price (due to change of j or  j)
is perfectly neutralized by changes in demand on markets other than j: In
other words - any reduction in the local demand for a good on a given fraction
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of markets is immediately neutralized through the balanced trade account by
increased demand in the remaining share of the markets. Thus, any changes
of IPR policies in lagging countries, or of trade policy in any country, have no
e¤ect on expected prots from a successful discovery in the frontier country and
hence are growth-neutral.
Now I restrict myself to study the e¤ects of changes of IPR and tari¤s on a
given lagging country. To study these e¤ects I concentrate on the equations (35)
 (37). Plugging (37) for wages into (35) and solving for per sector expenditures




= [n1 + (j)] [(1  h) bj ] 1 (39)
where:
(j) 
  gL + j + n1
" ()  j()
:
Note that when j = 0 (i.e. when the intellectual property rights in a given
lagging country are perfect) then 1=xj = L1=Lj : Thus, when intellectual prop-
erty is perfect, relative productivity of a given region is proportional to its size
measured in R&D capable labor force. However, if patents are imperfect, then
distance to the frontier increases with reductions in the quality of IPR protec-
tion. (@ j=@j < 0 hence @ (1=xj) =@j > 0). Consequently, a discrete
improvement of a countrys IPR regime results in conditional convergence to a
new position that is closer to the technological frontier. This is in contrast with
the recent theories on IPR and development (Helpman 1993, Grossman and
Lai, 2004). Taking into account the empirical nding about the costliness of the
technological transfer changes the results - IPR are useful also for the lagging
countries. Figure one presents an illustration of the dependence of distance to
the frontier as a function of quality of IPR and size of given economy (measured
in R&D capable workers).
The distance to the frontier of the given following economy (1=xj) is pre-
sented on the vertical axis - higher values of 1=xj correspond to greater distance
to the frontier. The horizontal axes represent the relative size of given economy
(L1=Lj) and the inverse of the quality of intellectual property protection (j).
The function presented in the gure increases in j and decreases in L1=Lj .
Thus, larger economies (in terms of R&D capable population) tend to be located
closer to the technological frontier. Weaker protection of intellectual property
(higher j) increases the distance to the technological leader.
Similarly, as in the frontier country, trade restrictions have no e¤ect on
conditional convergence of lagging countries. The underlying mechanism for
this is the same as in the frontier country - any changes in tari¤s result only in
changes in trade volumes but not in expected rewards from monopolistic prots.
A potential increase in tari¤s in some regions causes a decrease in exports to
these regions but the potential losses from this export slowdown are perfectly
neutralized by increased exports to other markets. These results tend to suggest
17
Figure 1: Distance to the frontier as a function of IPR quality and volume of
R&D capable labor.
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that, for a given lagging country, an improvement in the IPR regime seems to
be a better solution than pursuing tari¤ changes. The conclusions presented
above are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In a steady-state, a countrys relative per capita income depends
positively on its degree of protection of intellectual property rights (j) and its
size in terms of R&D capable population (Lj). Import tari¤s ( j) are neutral
in their e¤ect on a countrys relative per capita income.
4.1 Benets of engagement.
The model allows me to address the question of potential benets of engaging
in globalization. I consider engagement as accessing world trade and opening
to the international ow of ideas. The previous subsection analyzed the case of
a given lagging country participating in both international trade as well as in
international ideas transfer. This sections studies the case when a given lagging
country does not open at all (remains in autarky).
The case when a given country opens to the international ow of ideas only
has been developed by Howitt (2000) and further analyzed by Klenow and Ro-
dríguez (2005). They found that engagement in the world ow of ideas sig-
nicantly improves the economic performance of a single country, compared to
the case of autarky. This subsection further contributes by analyzing the cases
when trade openness is also possible.
A country becomes closed to trade (e.g. because  j = +1 or because trade
is excluded exogenously by geographical distance or some non-tari¤ barriers)
and has no access to international ow of ideas. This implies that output is sold
on the local market only.10 Such a specication allows us to solve the models
steady-state equations just for a single country. As shown in the appendix the
nal vertical R&D intensity and growth rate is constant and depends positively
on the quality of IPR protection.
A surprising nding is that autarky can lead to higher growth rates than full
openness. Under openness a country grows at a rate that is proportional to the
frontiers country growth rate n1. Under autarky a countrys growth depends
on only its own R&D. However, it may grow faster because fewer sectors will
be opened. Specically, if this country can impose strict IPR protection it can
actually achieve a higher rate of growth than it would under full participation
in global markets. In summary:
Proposition 3 If a given closed economy can impose a su¢ ciently high degree
of protection of intellectual property, and if the degree of competition in its local
market is lower than in the international markets, then this economy can achieve
higher rates of economic growth than if it were open.
Figure two presents this case graphically. The horizontal line (INT ) repre-
sents the frontiers R&D intensity - thus the growth rate of the globalized world.
10 In such setting local competition constraints the monopolistic price. Hence for i being
monopolistic pjt(i) = 
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Figure 2: Vertical R&D intensity of a closed - economy j
This rate does not depend on the level of protection of intellectual property in a
single economy, thus INT does not change in j . The line A symbolizes verti-
cal R&D intensity in j as a function of IPR quality in this country. As shown
in the appendix this line is downward - sloping in j : All IPR levels higher than
j result in a higher growth rate than the frontiers. Note that the possibility
of higher growth in a closed economy occurs as long as  > =( 1); i.e. when
international competition is more intense than local (limited by the size of dis-
covery ). If this does not hold, local competition is as intense as international,
closed economies are not able to generate higher growth than the globalized
world. This case corresponds to the dashed line A0 in gure two. Country j
cannot obtain higher intensity of vertical R&D than the open economies. More-
over, any weakening of IPR protection in j results in lower intensity of research
and leads to slower growth and divergence.
4.2 Income Structure
To close this section I examine the potential consequences of IPR improvements
on the income composition of a given lagging country. A commonly raised
argument against stronger intellectual property protection is that it benets only
capitalists whose incomes come mostly as dividends from invested capital.
According to such reasoning, workers whose incomes consist mostly of wages,
do not benet from these changes as much as "capitalists".
I study this claim by analyzing the e¤ect of changes of j on the composi-
tion of individual income. There are two main components of individual income:
wages earned in production/research and dividends paid by monopolistic com-
panies that produce consumption goods. Using (10) and (37) the ratio of wages
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Hence the derivative of the above expression with respect to j is positive.
Thus an improvement of the quality of IPR protection reduces the wage/prot
ratio. Weaker IPR implies that a larger share of income comes from wages
paid to labor, whereas stronger IPR translates into higher signicance of prots
from successful R&D investments. If a country has an unequal distribution of
equities, an improvement in IPR could indeed lead to a signicant distortion
away from labor, and increase inequality.
5 The Empirical Example
A simple look at some readily available cross-country data is consistent with
the ndings presented above. I check the theoretical prediction about the sig-
nicance of IPR and insignicance of tari¤s on the distance to the frontier.
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According to propositions two and three, weaker IPR should increase the dis-
tance to the frontier of given country irrespective of its openness. To do this
I need data on Intellectual Property Rights quality (IPRjt) across the world.
There are two issues that need to be addressed when specifying the quality of
IPR: the quality of law and the level of its enforcement. I refer to the IPR
quality index introduced by Ostergard (2000). This index is a multiplier of the
degree to which intellectual property is literally protected with the quality of
enforcement of given law. Higher values of the index correspond to higher qual-
ity of IPR in a given country. The values of the index range from ve (the best
quality of IPR protection) to one (the worst quality of IPR protection). The
second observable is the distance to the frontier (DISTjt), taken from Penn
World Table on real GDP per capita relative to the United States. My sample
consists of 67 countries11 , both OECD and non-OECD economies.
Following the theoretical predictions of Howitt (2000) and signalled by the
empirical studies of Lichtenberg (1993), I decide to control for the e¤ects of
investments on economic distance. I include the rate of investments as another
control variable in the regression. I take the data from Penn World Table on
the share of investments in GDP. Other controls I include in my sample are the
degree of openness, country size and the set of geographical characteristics.
The estimates of the linear coe¢ cients are presented in Table 1. These
estimates are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The IPR coe¢ cient
is always negative and highly signicant. Adding the time dummy or various
controls does not a¤ect the result.
























R2 0:467 0:607 0:635 0:607
An additional exercise is to check the role of openness in the relationship
between IPR and distance to frontier. To perform this exercise, the rst step is
11Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Zaire), Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pak-
istan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay,
USA Venezuela.
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to specify the subsets of open and closed economies. To do so it is not enough
to look at the tari¤ rates or at the share of trade in GDP. In fact tari¤s are just
a nominal control variable and do not reect many non - tari¤ barriers as well
as whether a given economy is oriented to exchange with the globalized world
or not. The share of trade in GDP is a highly endogenous variable and cannot
be used as a credible proxy of openness. In order to determine the degree of
openness of developing economies I take the index of openness introduced by
Sachs and Warner (1995) where the openness of a given country depends
on average level of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, black market premia, central
control of major exports, or whether a given country is classied as socialist.
Having dened the sub-samples that contain open and closed economies I
perform the regressions with distance to frontier (real GDP per capita relative
to the United States) as the dependant variable. The estimated values of para-
meters for the open economies are presented in table two, the results for closed
economies are presented in table three. Again, intellectual property rights is
highly signicant for the distance to frontier of given country.



















R2 0:513 0:606 0:609 0:608














R2 0:157 0:216 0:222
These correlations are not a test of the model, but it is encouraging that these
are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Better protection of intellectual
property tends to reduce the distance to the frontier. A more in depth empirical
analysis of this issue is a worthwhile subject of future research.
6 Conclusions
A central nding here is that the long run growth rate is una¤ected by either
trade agreements or potential changes in IPR regimes in technologically lagging
countries. This conclusion comes from the analysis of a standard multi-country
model of trade and economic growth without scale e¤ects. The conclusion is
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consistent with the empirical observations of no e¤ect of factor input growth
or increasing trade volumes on apparent long run economic growth rates in
industrialized countries.
The second message that comes from this paper is that because di¤usion of
technologies is not costless, di¤erences in knowledge adoption intensities may
explain a signicant portion of income di¤erences across countries. There are
two main components that a¤ect the cross - country di¤erences in copying activ-
ities: Firstly, the degree of intellectual property rights protection signicantly
a¤ects the long run relative productivity of a given country. Since the degree to
which intellectual property is protected positively a¤ects incentives to imitate,
an improvement of IPR regime results in conditional convergence towards the
technological frontier and to a new steady-state equilibrium. Secondly, the vol-
ume of skilled labor determines the relative position of a lagging region. Because
of positive externalities, larger countries o¤er products that are more desired by
consumers. This translates into higher expected prots from successful research
and higher R&D. These two conclusions t well the commonly known empirical
observations on conditional convergence (see Barro, 2001). The results of two
simple empirical regressions presented in section ve additionally support these
ndings.
The third observation is about the possible positive e¤ects of no openness
at all (in terms of trade and knowledge ows) on growth of a country. This is
because openness tends to utilize a countrys resources in full R&D engagement
in all the sectors that are subject to trade. This has the e¤ect of diluting R&D
e¤ort and lowering aggregate growth. By contrast under autarky, a potentially
higher growth rate may be generated since there is no dilution.
The last conclusion that needs to be highlighted regards the potential draw-
backs of IPR improvement. My model shows that better protection of intellec-
tual property causes a shift in the distribution of individual income. A larger
share of individual income comes from dividends paid by monopolistic rms.
When there exists an unequal distribution of assets in a given society, this could
lead to a signicant distortion away from labour. Increasing inequality could
trigger some undesired phenomena such as corruption and rent - seeking, that
could even halt the development of a given region.
I nish this section with an indication of some points in the analysis that will
be extended and improved in future research. I assumed throughout that each
country was too small to a¤ect world prices. This assumption will be relaxed
in future studies. Doing so would allow one to check what happens if a single
market matters for pricing decisions of rms or if a rm has enough market power
to a¤ect the prices in its sector. Another interesting task would be to focus more
on the aspect of local (domestic) competition. Clearly the IPR parameter j
captures to some extent the degree of domestic competition. Nevertheless, in my
study international competition was the major force driving the monopolistic
decision. One could go a step further and distinguish between IPR and local
competition policy. Finally future research could focus on the identication of
the other factors that a¤ect international knowledge spillovers Joint ventures,
capital ows, migration of key personnel and cultural/geographical proximity
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may all play important roles.
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Appendix
IPR and growth in a closed economy:
When a monopolist in j is constraint by the local competition only, it sets
the price equal to the marginal cost of the previous monopolist in given sector:












and the expected price equals to:
pj =  jwjt=Ajt (40)
This, together with (28) gives the labor market equation:
Ej
 j















The monopolistic prots earned by a monopolist in j become:
j = (1  1=)Ej (42)
The prot condition is derived by plugging (42) into (29):
(1  1=)Ej =
  gL + j

+ nj (43)
The above - presented labor market equation and prot condition can be
rewritten as the quadratic equation of nj :
0n
2
j + 1nj = 2 (44)
where:




 + (+ gL)j=] + j   (1  h) b
2 (j)  j [(  gL + j) (  1) = ()  (1  h) b]
so that nj is the positive square - root of (44) given by:
nj (j) =
p
21 (j)  402 (j)  1 (j)
20
The derivative of the above expression with respect to j is:
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Since 01 (j) > 0; 
0
2 (j) > 0 it follows that
12 n0j (j) < 0:





as long as: j
 
43   92 + 6  1

+ [(1  h)b(  1)2 + (  gL)(22   3+ 1)]
For positive j this holds since  > 1:
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